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## TWO NEW YORK STATES.

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THE question is here submitted, rather than discussed, whether the respective interests of New York City, New York State, and the country at large do not imperatively demand that the State of New York be divided into two States ?

If the proposition be first considered in its political aspects, few of those who take an active part in public affairs will dismiss it hastily. Certain facts, that seem to have been the more widely ignored as their meaning was plainer, must, in the light of this special inquiry, become sufficiently glaring to attract general attention. It will then be found that they are peculiarly suggestive, and that further indifference to their teachings may be pregnant with consequences that the City, the State and the Nation would have good cause to deplore.

The first of these facts is the regular oscillation of the Empire State, every four years, from one political pole to the other. In the last twenty years six Presidential elections have been held, and not once did New York cast its vote in favor of the candidate of the party which it had sustained in the previous contest. Republican in 1864 and Democratic in 1868, Republican in 1872 and Democratic in 1876, Republican in 1880 and Democratic in 1884, this State, with the mechanical precision of a pendulum, swung back to the Republican side in 1888.

In all instances but two the majority, or plurality, was an insignificant fraction of the total vote cast in the State. It was less than one per cent. in 1864, a trifle over one per cent. in 1868, 1.90 per cent. in 1880, less than one-tenth of one per cent. in 1884, and about one per cent. in 1888. The first exception was in 1872, when the State of New York, that had given Seymour a majority of ten thousand over Grant in 1868, gave Grant, then far less popular than at the time of his first election, a majority of fifty-two thousand over Greeley.

But this result, as everybody knows, was chiefly brought about by the abstention of many democrats ; for the total vote

cast in the State was twenty thousand less than in 1868, although the population had increased at its usual rate; and, while the Republican vote showed a gain of only twenty-one thousand, the Democratic vote showed a loss of forty-three thousand. The second exception, and the only one of any importance, was in 1876, when Tilden's plurality in this State amounted to thirty-two thousand seven hundred, or 3.21 per cent. of the vote cast within its borders.

In 1876, New York became the pivotal State *par excellence*, and has remained so ever since. Its small pluralities have settled three Presidential contests in succession, and we might say four, were it not for the work of the Electoral Commission. A few thousand, and, in one instance, a few hundred political "converts" have actually decided who should govern this mighty republic. At any time during that period it would have been in the power of a small but compact organization of political "strikers" to change the result. For aught we know there may be such an organization in existence; and if there is none as yet we need not despair of its advent, for in these days of trusts and syndicates the principle that there is strength in union cannot fail to impress itself some day upon the minds of impecunious politicians.

Nor is the political uncertainty of the State of New York, taken as a whole, the result of a healthy equipoise of opinion in all its parts. That portion of it which, small in area but densely populated, lies to the south of the Westchester County boundary line is persistently and overwhelmingly Democratic. The other portion is not less persistently and not less overwhelmingly Republican. The Democratic pluralities of the former section were 78,000 in 1876, 54,000 in 1880, 64,476 in 1884, and about 73,000 in 1888; the Republican pluralities of the latter were 46,000 in 1876; 75,000 in 1880; 63,429 in 1884; and about 86,000 in 1888. No other State is so completely divided in political sentiment by a geographical line, and no two States, however distant geographically, are wider apart politically than the two sections which we are now considering.

These two sections do not progress at the same rate. The smallest in area is still the smallest in population, but it is gaining fast upon the other. And here, for convenience of language and brevity of expression, let the section south of the Westchester

line, embracing the six counties of New York, King's, Queen's, Suffolk, Richmond, and Westchester, be known as the "Metropolitan counties," while the term "Northern counties" will be understood to mean all the other portion of the State. In the thirty years—1850–1880—the population of the Metropolitan counties increased from 801,000 to 2,098,000, or 161 per cent.; whereas that of the Northern counties increased from 2,295,000 to 2,984,000, or 30 per cent. only. From what is known of their respective growth in late years it is safe to say that in 1892, when the next Presidential election is to take place, the population of the State will be about equally divided between the two sections, and that in 1900, if not before, the Metropolitan counties will have a preponderance of numbers.

In ordinary times, there is at work a law of political gravitation, according to which the party prevailing within a certain area preserves and even increases its percentage of majority as the population in that area increases. The task of tracing this law to its origin might best devolve upon the psychologist, while any consideration of its effects on the body politic would properly belong to the social philosopher. The first of those intellectual speculators might find a parallel to it in the natural impulse of the *moutons de Panurge* to jump where one of them was seen jumping; while the second might lose his temper in viewing the corporate evils that necessarily flow from the readiness of each stupid individual to think like his nearest and, perchance, more stupid neighbor. But no attempt can be made here to philosophize so deeply and, perhaps, so needlessly. It is enough, for the practical purpose in view, to state that in the present condition of public intelligence, social ethics and political relations, there is such a law; and that, while it may not be eternal—or even so absolute as to effectively resist that higher law of progress through which, from time to time, the political sentiment of great masses of people undergoes a spontaneous and radical modification—yet its operation is sufficiently constant, under ordinary circumstances, to afford a correct basis of calculation as to the relative strength of political parties for a period of years more or less limited.

If this be admitted, the conclusion is obvious that the twenty years' deadlock in the Empire State cannot last much longer; and that, barring out the possibility of a great independent political

movement of the working classes, productive of much confusion, the time must soon come when the crushing Democratic majorities cast by the Metropolitan counties will carry the State at every election. Observe, that it would long have been in their power to do it but for the tariff question. They have, in fact, done it uninterruptedly for many years in State contests. With the exception of Cornell, whose election, in 1879, was the direct result of Tammany's rebellion, under the lead of John Kelly, against the Tilden wing of the Democracy, every governor of the State of New York for the past thirteen years was a Democrat. The outcome of the last campaign is more suggestive, perhaps, than any previous one. Cleveland was defeated, but Hill was elected. The tariff issue cannot live forever. It may not survive the terrible blow which it has received in the person of Cleveland ; or, by one of those sudden reversals of public judgment in economic matters which a crisis or a change of economic conditions frequently produces, what has thus far proved to be the popular side of the question may become the unpopular. At any rate, let it be withdrawn from politics, or for some reason lose its terrors, and from that moment a Republican constituency of more than 500,000 voters and 3,000,000 people will have lost all chances of ever being represented in the Electoral College, and probably also, a little later, in the United States Senate. Outside of the Metropolitan counties it will be a perfunctory duty to vote for a President. Concerning the settlement of those important issues which a national contest usually involves, the vast community in question, greater in population than any of the States but three, will have practically nothing to say and might as well be disfranchised.

In the matter of State legislation and State government, that great community would soon fare hardly better. The field of its political influence and action would be mostly confined to the administration of its cities and towns, and this even might be curtailed by the interference of the legislature. To all appeals for justice and home rule, it would, perhaps, be answered that the metropolis had likewise suffered, long and grievously, at the hands of corrupt partisans when the Republican counties had it in their power to make the laws.

Much has been said of the tyranny of majorities, and nothing is truer than that they may prove the worst of despots. To guard

against such a possible evil was the constant pre-occupation of our people a century ago, and the Constitution itself was not adopted without a struggle between the advocates of a strong government and those who esteemed individual freedom of even more value than national independence. In the course of time, however, the most ardent champions of liberty came to believe that the political institutions of this Republic, rooted in the principle of equal rights, pervaded throughout with the spirit of self-government, and resting on the fundamental independence of the smallest unit, although far from perfect, but readily perfectible, afforded ample security for the spontaneous and constant evolution of freedom. Surely they had not contemplated the possibility, under those institutions, of a stupendous despotism, a tyranny of the majority, such as we see growing in the State of New York. And, after all, it is not owing to any defect in our political institutions that this condition of affairs has developed. While they cannot, of themselves, prevent it if we choose to submit to it, they afford an easy remedy if we desire to put an end to it. By a simple division of the Empire State into two States, each section would immediately secure its autonomy and take its proper place in national politics, enjoying neither more nor less influence than its relative importance justly entitles it to.

But what is simple and just is not what necessarily commends itself to the "practical politicians." And insomuch as this class of people have it largely in their power to promote or defeat any public measure, the question, "How will it work?" must be considered from their own partisan standpoint.

Of the thirty-eight States \* that now compose the Union, six-

(*) Democratic States.		Republican States.	
Votes.	Votes.	Votes.	Votes.
Alabama..... 10	Missouri..... 16	Colorado..... 3	Nevada..... 3
Arkansas..... 7	New Jersey..... 9	Illinois..... 22	New Hampshire.. 4
Delaware..... 3	North Carolina... 11	Iowa..... 13	Ohio..... 23
Florida..... 4	South Carolina... 9	Kansas..... 9	Oregon..... 3
Georgia..... 12	Tennessee..... 12	Maine..... 6	Pennsylvania... 30
Kentucky..... 13	Texas..... 13	Massachusetts.. 14	Rhode Island ... 4
Louisiana..... 8	Virginia..... 12	Minnesota..... 7	Vermont..... 4
Maryland..... 8		Nebraska..... 5	Wisconsin..... 11
Mississippi..... 9	Total..... 156	Total.....	161

*Doubtful States.*

Votes.	Votes.
California..... 8	New York..... 36
Connecticut..... 6	Michigan..... 13
Indiana..... 15	West Virginia... 6
Total.....	84

teen (including New Jersey) may be set down as Democratic beyond question, and an equal number as indisputably Republican. Under the present apportionment, the first group of States casts one hundred and fifty-six and the second one hundred and sixty-one votes in the Electoral College. Of late, the States somewhat uncertain on account of their small pluralities were : On the Democratic side, Connecticut with six votes and West Virginia with six ; on the Republican side, California with eight votes, and Michigan with thirteen. The absolutely unreliable States were New York with thirty-six votes and Indiana with fifteen.

But, in view of recent events, it is now sufficiently obvious to the impartial observer that if the Republicans found it impossible to carry the manufacturing State of Connecticut in two successive presidential campaigns conducted upon the tariff issue exclusively, they cannot, under circumstances either similar or even less favorable to them, carry it in the future. Connecticut, like New Jersey,—and for the same reasons—must be written down a Democratic State, subject, of course, to such changes as may there and elsewhere be produced by national issues entirely new and profoundly stirring. On the other hand, West Virginia is showing plainly, by the steady decrease of her Democratic pluralities, by the culminating closeness of the last presidential contest within her borders, and by the rapid increase of Republican majorities in those of her counties which, owing to the development of her industries, are growing fast in population, that the same economic forces that bind Pennsylvania to the Republican party have actually detached her from the galaxy of Democratic States. Of California little can be said, notwithstanding her almost unbroken record of microscopic Republican pluralities. But of Michigan it may be observed that the disintegrating influences of Greenback, Labor and Prohibition politics are evidently tending to make that State the most uncertain of all. By fusion and confusion the Democrats have repeatedly carried it upon State issues, securing a large majority in the Legislature, and even in the Congressional delegation. Indiana, under the same influences as those which can be seen at work in Michigan, became a doubtful State in 1876. By a singular coincidence, it has in each Presidential contest since that time given a small plurality to the same party that New York happened to sustain. That local pride and expectations had something to do with the

hard-won success of the President-elect in his own State is a reasonable supposition; but that Indiana, in ordinary circumstances, belongs to the Democrats, appears to the disinterested observer of political currents a foregone conclusion.

Now, it must be borne in mind that, taking the States as represented in the Electoral College at this time, if Connecticut, for the reasons given, be granted to the Democrats, the party that does not carry New York can succeed only by carrying all the other doubtful States, viz., California, Indiana, Michigan and West Virginia. This possibility, as we have just seen, is reduced to a minimum by the evident tendency of West Virginia to become irrevocably Republican, and of Indiana to become steadfastly Democratic. On the other hand, the party that carries New York needs only one of those four States to elect its candidate.

True, the positive and relative standing of the States in the Electoral College will be somewhat altered by the next decennial reapportionment of votes in accordance with the population returns of the census of 1890. But from what is known of the growth of the country in its various sections, it does not appear that any change from this source may be such as to substantially alter the relative strength of the two parties. The Republicans, however, may and doubtless will improve the opportunity they have of strengthening themselves by the admission of one State at least, and probably two States, cut out of the Territories, thereby gaining from six to ten votes in the Electoral College. But even then, with Indiana on the Democratic side, the vote of New York will settle the contest. In any way that we may figure, if the least regard is paid to actual conditions and known data, the conclusion is inevitable that, unless New York be divided into two States, the comparatively small preponderance of one of its sections over the other will absolutely determine our national policy, in so far as that policy is involved in the election of a President. And, as this preponderance is increasingly Democratic, the obvious prospect is a period of Democratic administration, beginning in 1892, and the end of which can only come through the operation of forces now unknown and unforeseen.

It is, therefore, superfluous to observe that any proposition to divide the State of New York into two States must, *a priori*, be regarded with abhorrence by the partisan Democrat and viewed



with extreme favor by the partisan Republican. Upon further investigation, it will be found, however, that the division would by no means have the effect of transferring from one party to the other an indefinite and indisputable lease of power. It would simply keep the Presidency in doubt, and the two parties on their best behavior. Let us take, as a basis of calculation, the present number of electoral votes cast by each State, amounting in all to four hundred and one. To this should be added the ten votes of the two new States cut out of the territories, and the two additional votes to which New York would be entitled by its division into two States, equal in population and having each nineteen votes. The total number of electoral votes would thus be increased to four hundred and thirteen, of which two hundred and seven would be required to elect a president. Upon this basis, and granting—for the reasons above given—Connecticut and Indiana to the Democrats, and West Virginia to the Republicans, the two parties would be exactly equal in *known* strength, each being sure of one hundred and ninety-six votes, as follows :

## DEMOCRATIC STATES.

The 16 States unquestionably Democratic (see foot-note, page 90) .....	156 votes
Connecticut (6) and Indiana (15).....	21 "
One-half of New York.....	19 "
Total.....	196 "

## REPUBLICAN STATES.

The 16 States unquestionably Republican (see foot-note page 90).....	161 votes
West Virginia.....	6 "
The two new States cut out of the territories.....	10 "
One-half of New York.....	19 "
Total.....	196 "

## DOUBTFUL STATES.

California.....	8 votes
Michigan.....	13 "
Total.....	21 "

California and Michigan would cast the deciding votes. It has already been remarked that, although their respective record in national politics is Republican, both are now uncertain, especially the latter. Both are also far better qualified than New York to act the part of arbiters in a close presidential contest, because in both the political sentiment is fairly divided throughout, whereas in the Empire State it is intensely sectional. Moreover—and this is of radical import—any change, great or small,

that might occur in other parts of the country would readily, according to its direction, either dwarf the influence of those two States, by rendering it more or less superfluous, or absolutely destroy it by turning the scales against them ; whereas we have seen that so long as New York can cast thirty-six votes on one side, great changes might occur elsewhere without affecting the general result.

This proposition cannot be made too plain. Michigan and California would vote either on the same side or on opposite sides. In the first case, they would cast twenty-one votes for the same candidate. Obviously, then, any change by which twenty-two votes were added to theirs would show that the successful candidate could have been elected without their support ; whereas any change by which twenty-two votes were cast in the opposite direction would defeat the party favored by those two States. In the second case, Michigan would cast thirteen votes on one side, and California eight votes on the other. Obviously, any change of six votes would then produce the same results as a change of twenty-two in the first case.

It has been deemed necessary to enter at some length into considerations of this character, tedious as they are, and of more interest to the student of politics than to the average citizen, because, if the issue presented by the title of this paper is to become a public topic, none of the data essential to an honest and intelligent discussion of it should be purposely or ignorantly neglected. But there are other considerations, not less fundamental and of a higher order, some of which will suggest themselves, while a few may properly be suggested here in conclusion.

First, as to the relations of the metropolis with the country at large. Should it be claimed by some that political separation might prove injurious to the city of New York by placing in the hands of another State the control of canals and railroads which have played an important part in her development, the reply is obvious that no serious inconvenience has ever been felt from the control held by the State of New Jersey over many avenues of equal importance. Likewise, the city of Providence has never been injuriously affected by the narrow boundaries of the State of Rhode Island. The power of regulating inter-State commerce, which is vested in the federal government, will undoubtedly assert

itself with increasing energy. To extensive and far-reaching interests it affords a vastly better and broader security than does State dominion over a large area. In fact, we have already seen that redress could be obtained through it, which would have been denied if State legislatures had been sovereign in such matters.

Secondly, as to the probable fate of the proposition if it were submitted to the people of New York. For obvious reasons, the Republicans might be expected to support it in a body. Many sensible Democrats, who rightly believe that the public interests are not best promoted when the party in power feels impregnable, might agree to it. A number of extreme partisans on the Democratic side, chiefly in the Northern section, would undoubtedly oppose it; but in the Metropolitan counties many of the same class, allured by the vistas of emolument and position which a new State, apparently to be placed under their immediate and exclusive control, would open to them, might reconcile themselves to the idea of sacrificing their rural fellows for the good of the country. And here let it be observed that these selfish expectations might not be realized, to the extent at least of proving more detrimental to the metropolis than its government has been under State interference and manipulation; for home rule would unquestionably awaken a sense of power among the citizens, and of responsibility among the officials, which is now profoundly dormant.

Lastly, as to the new forces that the proposed change might set in motion. Among those who might be expected to warmly sustain the proposition, should be mentioned those shifting bodies of voters, unknown political quantities, which, now united and formidable, then pulverized into factions, have for the last few years puzzled the country. That their erratic motions are the manifestations of a new and as yet wild force, seeking in an awkward way a legitimate channel through the body politic, will not be denied by any man of sense. If we must have a Labor party—and it were folly to believe that the men who but lately cast 68,000 votes for Henry George will not again come together some day, followed by many others and with a clearer notion of their actual purpose—if we must have a Labor party, let the political conditions be such as to correspond with the necessities that call it into existence. In great cities like New York and Brooklyn, where immense num-

bers of artisans, operatives, laborers, clerks, and wage-earners generally are not only congregated, but to a great extent organized, for mutual protection, certain problems must sooner or later be solved that a legislature largely composed of the representatives of small towns and rural districts is unfit to deal with. And they cannot be solved too early if they are to be solved peacefully.

LUCIEN SANIAL.